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The spectre of environmental “domestic extremism” has long been postulated by police leaders and security 
analysts in Britain. It is a narrative that has justified the commitment of enormous amounts of government 
resources towards police intelligence work directed at non-violent direct action campaigns. Most 
controversially, this has included the long-term infiltration of environmental (and other) activist groups by 
undercover police. This article provides a critical analysis of the justifications put forward in support of the 
covert surveillance of environmental activists in Britain. The paper proceeds by way of a single case study – 
a high profile, environmental direct action protest in the north of England – in order to reveal the levels of 
abuse, manipulation and deception at the basis of undercover protest policing. Through their court case, the 
activists involved with this action were able to obtain rare insights into the police authorisation documents 
for the undercover operation that had led to their arrests. An analysis of these documents provides us with a 
glimpse of the contradictory justifications given by senior police officers for infiltration – now under 
scrutiny by a public inquiry. The picture of undercover policing that has emerged in recent years gives 
ground for a re-assessment of the character and legitimacy accorded to the ‘British model of protest 
policing’, a re-assessment in which social movement scholarship should play a central part. 
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Introduction 
Environmental direct action (EDA) is a recognisable aspect of protest politics in the United Kingdom. 
As a tactical repertoire, it has played a significant role in the opposition to road-building, genetically 
modified crops, the aviation and ‘fossil fuel’ industries amongst others (Wall, 1999; Seel et al., 2000; 
Plows et al., 2004; Doherty et al., 2007; Russell et al., 2017). While in the most part expressly 
committed to non-violence, environmental activists have often experimented with innovative disruptive 
actions – from land occupations and squats to small-scale ‘ecotage’ and property damage. As in other 
societies with widespread support for strong environmental protection and ecological justice, the police 
in England and Wales have taken a keen interest. And although the existence of undercover operatives, 
either employed by the police or by private business, had long been assumed as a possibility, firm proof 
of the extent of this infiltration only came in October 2010 when a well-known and apparently 
committed activist, Mark Kennedy, was outed as a former undercover police officer. 
Kennedy’s undercover deployment, which saw him build an elaborate cover identity using the 
alias Mark Stone, had lasted over seven years from his first appearance in the EDA scene in 
Nottingham in 2003, and it took him beyond England and Wales to infiltrate protest networks in 
Scotland, Ireland and several other European countries. Amongst the groups that he was active in 
during that time were the anti-G8 Dissent! network, the Camp for Climate Action, Saving Iceland and 
Rossport Solidarity. Whilst employed by the Metropolitan Police Service, and for a brief while by the 
private security company Global Open, Kennedy spent significant amounts of time living the life of his 
undercover persona. Issued with a fake identity and training to act as a covert human intelligence 
source (CHIS) for his home unit, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), he deceived 
several women into long-term intimate relationships with him. Those relationships, and the friendships 
he struck up with other environmental activists, gave his fake identity a level of credibility and 
privileged access to the networks of activists, their communications and plans. The long-term 
deployment also caused profound emotional harm and suffering. After his exposure, the shock, 
disbelief and hurt experienced by those who were targeted by Kennedy and his supervisors in the 
NPOIU soon gave rise to a desire to understand why and how they had become targets for the 
sophisticated and lengthy undercover operations. Although their questions have been met with a wall of 
silence on the part of the police, answers are beginning to appear elsewhere. 
Two Metropolitan Police undercover units have come under closer scrutiny in recent years: the 
Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) which used various names between 1968 and 2008 as part of the 
Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch and Kennedy’s NPOIU overseen by the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) between 1999 and 2011. The full extent to which these units infiltrated protest 
groups including environmental campaigns remains unclear, but statements made by the Chief 
Constable of Derbyshire Police Mick Creedon, who headed the police-internal investigation Operation 
Herne, indicated that the SDS alone had targeted hundreds of groups and that some 150 undercover 
officers worked for both units (see Undercover Research Group, 2016 and Campaign Opposing Police 
Surveillance, 2016). The tactics used to develop and maintain cover identities are widely regarded as 
immoral and frequently unlawful, and are subject to ongoing criminal investigations and to an 
independent public inquiry into undercover practices and regulations in England and Wales. Policing 
protest through infiltration has involved the use of intimate and sexual relationships, often over a period 
of years, the use of dead children’s identities as aliases without the knowledge of the deceased’s 
parents, and withholding evidence from courts and juries. In some instances, police officers fathered 
children with the activists they had targeted (see Schlembach, 2016; Loadenthal, 2014; Lubbers, 2015). 
Despite the enormous impact that this exposure had on activists and on their activism, social 
movement scholarship has not yet carried out an in-depth analysis. While in the past, the surveillance 
and infiltration of protest has often been neglected theoretically because of the obvious limitations 
placed on its empirical analysis, the public exposure of Kennedy and several of his former colleagues 
now warrants a thorough re-assessment of what we know about protester-police interactions, 
surveillance and repression in Britain over the past 50 years. The picture that emerges from those 
campaigners who are bringing to light the sustained involvement of undercover officers in key roles of 
social movement organisations and in informal activist groups is that monitoring, disruption and 
facilitation was integral to the policing strategy over this period. The analysis presented here is based 
on a reading of a specific protest event – the Drax ‘coal train hijacking’ in June 2008. Following the 
arrests of 29 activists, their trial and sentencing, it emerged that a key role in the protest had been 
played by Mark Kennedy. This information had been withheld from the defence lawyers. In the appeals 
process that followed, the activists were able to see the police’s authorisation of the Kennedy 
deployment. The police narratives of ‘controlling domestic extremism’ that serve as justifications for 
the infiltration of climate activists entailed in these documents are subjected to critical analysis and 
contrasted to interview data with some of the activists themselves. 
My contention here is that the exposure of undercover police officers in activist communities 
pose a challenge to social movement scholarship in the sense that some of the most high-profile 
campaigns and protests in Britain since 1968 may have been shaped by the involvement of police 
infiltrators, and that public order policing was significantly informed by such deployments. The usual 
focus of social movement studies in Britain on the campaigners themselves – that is their background, 
politics, mobilisation repertoires, etc. – is insufficient here. Similarly, the study of overt police-
protester interactions, while important, needs to take account of the possibility that at an invisible level, 
policing decisions were made with more information and knowledge than previously assumed. Finally, 
we need to look at the possibility that the undercover police’s role often went beyond intelligence 
gathering and involved both disruption and facilitation, with little or no accountability. It is proposed 
that existing social movement scholarship can be usefully brought into dialogue with surveillance 
studies and critical policing scholarship to meet this challenge. 
Intrusive police surveillance in Britain 
In the Marxist and critical criminological literature, the surveillance of militant and subversive political 
movements have long been seen as defining aspects of the state function, also in liberal democracies 
(e.g. Bunyan, 1977; Marx, 1988; Neocleous, 2008; Gillham, 2011). The early manifestations of the 
surveillance state in Britain warranted a different look at the key policing agencies tasked with 
fabricating and maintaining the hegemonic social and economic order in Britain amidst political 
conflict and industrial dispute. Maureen Cain, specifically, criticised the traditional focus by policing 
scholars on the visible forms of social control and policing, which failed to examine the invisible work 
of state agencies tasked with law and order: 
They have ignored them theoretically because they were constrained to ignore them empirically. Thus ‘the 
police’ have been presented as a more or less homogenous structure, divided internally only by dominant 
preoccupation with traffic, juveniles, criminal investigation or just plain patrolling. That would not matter if 
one could simply adds [sic] on other functions – internal intelligence gathering, control of overseas spy 
operations, counter revolutionary preparations and so on – but one cannot. For to add on these extra tasks 
transforms the equation (Cain, cited in McLaughlin, 2007: 61). 
Of course, in the neoliberal conjuncture, the police are rarely presented as a ‘homogenous structure’ 
since the plural policing paradigm has become prevalent. Yet, key work in this area is still unable to be 
applied directly to the post-9/11 and post-7/7 context of security policing or the gathering of 
intelligence for the purposes of informing policing strategies that deal with animal rights and 
environmental protest.  
This notwithstanding, there is now a growing literature on the controversial undercover policing 
techniques used in Britain to gather intelligence on political activists and protest movements – 
especially anti-racist and family justice campaigns, trade unionists, animal rights activists and 
environmental groups – including in some instances their long-term ‘sexual infiltration’ (Lewis and 
Evans, 2013; Loadenthal, 2014; Lubbers, 2015). Apart from such activist, journalistic and 
criminological accounts, parts of the academic debate on the subject has been carried out within the 
framework of (critical) terrorism studies (Spalek and O’Rawe, 2014; Bonino and Kaoullas, 2015) and 
draws on the narrative frameworks provided by former undercover police officers themselves (for 
example Lambert 2014; Mills 2013). 
This debate centres on the role of the SDS and the NPOIU, two British covert policing units 
attached to the Metropolitan Police Service between 1968 and 2011, which are now subject to a public 
inquiry (Schlembach, 2016). It is the result of the exposures of (former) undercover officers such as 
Mark Kennedy and, crucially, details provided by a whistleblower, Peter Francis, who had worked for 
the Special Demonstration Squad. Francis alleged that the family of Stephen Lawrence had been kept 
under covert surveillance by his unit. 
In what follows, I argue that protest research can usefully engage with critical policing 
scholarship and the surveillance studies field. In the field of social movement studies, the relative lack 
of research into undercover policing and infiltration may be explained by a fear to tap into 
conspiratorial language and an inability to verify accounts of infiltration that are supported by 
movement participants themselves. But the British case, a range of police-internal reports and the 
public inquiry allow social movement scholars to re-assess past and present protest by incorporating 
knowledge from policing studies, critical criminology and surveillance research. Examining the case of 
Mark Kennedy appears particularly productive due to the amount of information already unearthed by 
investigative journalists and targeted activists, as well as Kennedy’s corroboration of many of the 
accusations. Although the analysis presented in this article is focused on just one protest event that 
Kennedy was deployed to monitor, it is possible to reach more far reaching conclusions about the 
extent of surveillance of environmental activism, the justifications offered for it by the police 
surveillance units themselves, and the long-lasting impact on transgressive political protest. 
Environmental direct action and the criminal justice system 
The deployment of undercover officers to report on the political campaigns of left-wing and 
environmental activists in Britain does not just raise ethical questions of police practice and 
professionalism. It would be too easy to dismiss the transgressions that have so far been uncovered as 
‘rogue behaviour’. Instead, questions of a more straightforwardly political nature must be asked: to 
what extent is disruptive protest seen as a threat to national security and public safety?  
In Britain, EDA is usually understood by social movement researchers through the lens of an 
anarchist and do-it-yourself ethos that is marked by suspicion towards state structures and corporate 
bodies. While action repertoires range from ‘ecotage’ to street carnivals, covert direct actions, taken 
together by large groups of activists who weigh the repercussions of being arrested for relatively minor 
offences are commonly seen as justified. The arrests of 29 activists who scaled a train carrying coal to 
Drax power station after bringing it to a controlled halt in 2008 is one such example, which can 
illustrate that facing arrest and prosecution are ‘normal events in the life cycle of many protest 
movements’ (Barkan, 2006: 183). It also reveals how activists are acutely aware of the social and 
ideological construction of political dissent as violence, extremism or terrorism – and that they take 
measures to demarcate themselves from such labelling, even if authorities do not. 
Importantly, in the UK at least, the demarcation of EDA from extremism and terrorism finds 
recognition in the criminal courts, specifically for indictable offences tried by juries. Comparing the 
civil law traditions of France and Belgium with the common law jurisdictions in England and Wales, 
Doherty and Hayes (2015) note the differential effects of juries on the criminal trials of environmental 
activists. Activists charged with criminal offences related to EDA, including the frequent charges of 
aggravated trespass, criminal damage or public order offences, have a significant chance of acquittal if 
they have the opportunity to argue their defence before a jury. Even where they are found guilty, they 
mostly incur minor sentences, such as conditional discharges, fines or community service. As 
examples, the trials of English activists who destroyed fields of genetically modified crops mostly 
ended in acquittals in Crown Courts (Doherty and Hayes, 2012; 2014). Acquittals by juries frequently 
followed ‘lawful excuse’ defences, with protesters pleading not guilty to charges brought under the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971. In recent years, English Crown Courts have acquitted activists charged 
with causing damage to genetically modified crops, factory equipment of weapons manufacturer EDO 
in Brighton and a US fighter plane at Fairford airbase (Doherty and Hayes, 2015: 36). 
The overt surveillance of protest is now a routine aspect of public demonstrations in most 
Western democracies. It is often manifested in video surveillance (Ullrich and Wollinger, 2011) by 
police units specialised in intelligence gathering techniques. In Britain, this role is usually taken up by 
Evidence Gatherers (EG) and Forward Intelligence Teams (FIT) (Aston, 2017). It is worth noting 
however that the routine videoing of protest by state and private security actors is frequently met by 
new forms of video activism and counter-surveillance (Monahan, 2006; Bennett, 2008; Wilson and 
Serisier, 2010; Bradshaw, 2013; Daphi et al., 2013; Brisman, 2014). In contrast, technological 
surveillance of protest and intelligence-gathering through informants and infiltrators aim at invisibility. 
The involvement of undercover officers in direct action networks also raises important concerns 
regarding their relationship to the courts. According to Mark Ellison QC, who led an investigation into 
possible miscarriages of justice resulting from unsafe convictions, the involvement of undercover 
police was frequently withheld from the criminal trials of campaigners (Ellison and Morgan, 2015), a 
practice then Home Secretary Theresa May termed ‘appalling’ (Evans, 2015). As a result the 
convictions of campaigners were quashed because prosecutors withheld evidence, including the 
identity of undercover officers, from judges and juries.  
Case Study: Operation Pegasus and the Drax 29 
The quashed convictions of the activists who stood trial in the Drax 29 case also underpin my case 
study. In June 2008, a group of environmental protesters reportedly ‘hijacked’ a scheduled delivery of 
1,000 tons of coal to Drax power station in Yorkshire, after they acted out the emergency procedures 
for stopping a train using red flag signals (BBC, 2008). Wearing white paper boiler-suits and one 
donning a costume of a canary bird, they were able to use the safety procedures to bring the train to a 
controlled halt. Twenty-nine activists were arrested and charged with stopping the train and obstructing 
the railway under the Malicious Damage Act 1861. Some of the Drax 29, as the group became known, 
defended themselves in Leeds Crown Court and were complimented by the judge for making an 
‘eloquent, sincere, moving and engaging’ case to the court (Wainwright, 2009). Nonetheless, they 
found themselves convicted of obstructing engines on railways. They all received non-custodial 
sentences, ranging from 60 hours community service to 12 months probation. Notably, the defendants 
were barred from making a ‘lawful excuse’ defence, as the prosecution did not base its case on the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 Instead, they resorted to a ‘necessity’ defence, arguing that their actions 
were a necessary response to the threat of climate change. This echoed a successful lawful excuse 
defence by six Greenpeace activists who had been charged with criminal damage caused to the 
Kingsnorth coal-fired power station in South East England two years earlier (for a discussion see 
Doherty and Hayes, 2015). 
Their acquittal by a jury was seen as a milestone for the climate action movement. In the Drax 29 case, 
on the other hand, the judge did not permit a ‘climate change defence’, effectively barring the 
defendants from calling expert witnesses. 
In January 2014, the Court of Appeal quashed the Drax 29 sentences, ruling that there had been 
‘a complete and total failure, for reasons which remain unclear, to make a disclosure fundamental to the 
defence’ (BBC, 2014). This failed disclosure refers to the deployment of Kennedy on the Drax protest 
as one of the drivers taking activists to the protest site. As a result of their wrongful convictions, several 
of the Drax defendants have been given ‘core participant’ status in the ongoing Undercover Policing 
Inquiry, where they will be asked to give evidence. As part of the appeals process, the activists were 
given access to the partially redacted police authorisation documents for Kennedy, which I have seen 
and to which I refer below. The ‘Drax disclosure’ gives us a rare insight into the details of an 
undercover operation targeting a group of non-violent protesters, as well as some indication of the 
justifications that senior police officers give for the deployment of CHIS. Issued by West Yorkshire 
Police, the document reviews ‘the use and conduct’ of its source. In the document, the identity of 
Kennedy is not disclosed. Instead, it makes reference to an undercover officer (UCO), to Kennedy’s 
employer the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, and to what it has called ‘Operation Pegasus’. It 
states that the review is issued to ‘update the Authorising Officer on the progress of the operation to 
date’ and to add two more individuals (with no obvious connection to the Drax protest) to ‘the subjects 
authorised for specific infiltration by the UCO [Kennedy] and Operation Pegasus’. The disclosure 
concludes by affirming the presence of the undercover officer in the ‘Climate Change campaign’, citing 
his deployment as ‘proportionate and necessary providing quality intelligence on groups planning 
serious criminal activity’. 
Dirty Data and Activist Narratives 
For the purpose of the following analysis, the Drax disclosure documents relating to Operation Pegasus 
are treated as ‘hidden and dirty data’ (Marx, 1984). This is defined by Marx (1984: 79) as ‘information 
which is kept secret and whose revelation would be discrediting or costly in terms of various types of 
sanctioning’. Despite the relative absence of dirty data from social research, it has underpinned some 
innovative methodological approaches in surveillance studies (see Hameed and Monaghan, 2012; 
Walby and Monaghan, 2011). In and of themselves, the disclosures relating to this case are not 
particularly damaging. But detailed empirical material of this kind can inform our understanding of the 
larger picture. Taken together with information about undercover operations from subject access and 
freedom of information requests, whistle-blowers, civil cases, internal and independent reviews, as well 
as parliamentary scrutiny, the Drax disclosure helps us answer questions regarding the minutiae of 
undercover authorisations and justifications. It is also worth noting that the communications and 
justifications of undercover authorisations were intended to remain confidential and available to 
specific police sources only. In fact, senior police officers and managers have repeatedly pointed to the 
possible risks associated with confirming undercover operations.  
To complement the analysis of the Drax disclosure and to consider a contrasting perspective, 
the analysis draws on four semi-structured interviews with Drax 29 protesters who had their 
convictions overturned on appeal. Two are now named core participants in the public inquiry. Although 
the defendants in the Drax 29 trial are publicly named, I have chosen to anonymise the respondents 
selected for this study. I have benefitted here from contacts made during extensive periods of fieldwork 
and participant observation between 2006 and 2011, including the Climate Camps at Drax, Heathrow, 
Kingsnorth, Blackheath Common and Edinburgh (see Schlembach, 2011, Schlembach et al., 2012). 
The small number of quotations that I use here to illustrate the activists’ perspectives are from a 
separate study of how those protesters affected by long-term police intrusion engage with the official 
inquiry into undercover policing (see Schlembach, 2016) and for which ethical approval has been 
given.  
“Protest is not Terrorism” 
The exposure of undercover police so deeply embedded in social movements in Britain raises larger 
theoretical and operational issues.  Here, however, I have decided to focus on a specific case study. 
Rehearsing the bigger picture (e.g. Bonino and Kaoullas, 2014) has unfortunately missed important 
points over how the moniker of ‘domestic extremism’ has been made to stick to a wide variety of 
activists and campaigners. It is clear from the narratives offered by activists themselves that the serious 
criminality angle promoted by the police agencies is severely limited. It is simply not in line with the 
kind of activities in which environmental protesters are engaged. It appears that the activists all 
experienced profound moments of dissociation or dissonance with the official or mediatised accounts 
of their actions.  
In my interviews, dissonance was repeatedly expressed through searching questions and a sense 
of disbelief. Patrick, for example, asked: 
In terms of protest in a democratic society how is the presence of the police within campaigns […] justified? How 
prevalent were they? It’s like we currently know about 15 of these cops, all of whom slept with the people they 
were spying on, all of whom took part in like really dubious and abusive practices. You know, there’s no cop that 
we know about that has a kind of nice, in inverted commas, clean record, even if you agree with the concept behind 
them infiltrating protest groups in the first place, which obviously we don’t!  
Obviously there’s all these different intertwining issues here and there’s the underlying question of should these 
police have been on these kind of missions at all, infiltrating environmental groups, infiltrating peace or justice 
campaigns, infiltrating trade union workers, like just all this awful stuff they were doing? 
Activists were also concerned that they were being tarnished with the terrorism brush, at a time when 
such labelling could be politically damaging. Joe stated: 
Their [the police’s] definition of terrorism is incredibly broad, it’s a really wide net that it casts. I think that you 
can see that in terms of the blurring of the line of what terrorism was and wasn’t [in police accounts of protest].  
So for instance in our case, part of the reason that I pushed to or made the move to get involved in this [the public 
inquiry into undercover policing] is because I know that they will, the police will, justify our infiltration on the 
grounds that our group was engaged in some sort of criminal activity or direct action or public disorder and 
violence, and they kind of described the group at one point as the most violent group in the land, which is a 
complete exaggeration. 
For some, also the accusation of serious criminality did not mesh with the reality of protest activity. In 
fact, they questioned the relationship between the presence of undercover police in campaigns and law 
enforcement, as in most cases information gathered by covert sources did not lead to arrests or 
prosecutions. Toby said: 
Years and years [of infiltration…], a lack of any visible impact of that involvement, they got away with it, and we 
became aware that from the moment of planning the action to the end, the police knew everything. They knew of 
some of the biggest and high profile direct actions, […] not sure how that is consistent that we are an actual threat. 
My domestic extremism file [obtained via a subject access request from the Metropolitan police] only lists the 
demonstrations I was on. But I was still monitored. 
While my interviewees tended to state that they posed no substantial risk to public order, Sean was 
more ambivalent: 
I was shocked that the police could commit such abuses against animal and environmental campaigns. [But] you 
could argue that this [the suppression of dissent] is the function of the police and it is not that surprising that they 
want know what is going on. 
The ambivalence at the heart of such an assessment is also relevant to Operation Pegasus itself. At an 
operational level, undercover policing is justified as leading to intelligence for the purposes of 
preventing serious crime or prosecuting offenders. Yet for the majority of Kennedy’s deployment, his 
intelligence was not used in this way. In fact, the intelligence picture that he contributed to building 
talked up the threat of domestic extremism – a purpose that my interviewees were clearly aware of – 
when in one way or another, they all asserted the axiom that ‘protest is not terrorism’. 
“Serious criminality and domestic extremism” 
The rationale for Kennedy’s deployment on Operation Pegasus is provided in detail in the Drax 
disclosure documents, stating its goal to involve Kennedy in protest activity connected to the Camp for 
Climate Action. Climate Camp campaigners were treated as a compound group – targeted because of 
their political activity, not due to existing evidence of planned criminal actions. In one extract, the 
infiltration of activists is justified in this way: 
It is very rare for collateral intrusion to occur because [Kennedy’s name redacted] spends the majority of [his] time 
with likeminded people engaged in activism.  
The minutiae of Kennedy’s deployment in relation to the Drax protest are revealed in his personal 
notebooks of the day of the protest: 
I drove a van with a number of people in the back to a holding point for 0600 hours. A number of spotters were 
positioned along the train’s route to call in when a coal train was spotted. I pulled up and people got out the back of 
the van. I saw them walk up the track. I saw people in bright orange uniforms with a red flag walk along the track 
towards the Aire River rail bridge. 
Although Kennedy did not himself take part in halting the train, his role as a driver was clearly 
instrumental. That local authorising officers would seek to use covert surveillance for the monitoring of 
a non-violent, yet disruptive, direct action protest is not altogether surprising.  
But the Drax disclosure documents also entail a remarkable addition – a handwritten note by 
Anton Setchell, who at the time was the National Coordinator for Domestic Extremism (NCDE). 
Setchell was in charge of Kennedy’s unit, the NPOIU, as well as two other anti-extremism units: the 
National Extremism Tactical Co-ordination Unit (NETCU) and the National Domestic Extremism 
Team. Notably, one of the UK’s most senior counterterrorism police officers personally saw fit to 
recommend the deployment of Kennedy on the Drax protest. In his letter he writes: 
My role is not that of authorising officer, but as NCDE, to have the opportunity to comment on this deployment 
prior to the AO [authorising officer] reviewing the authority… This operation/deployment is focused on key areas 
of Domestic Extremism which I can say sit in the ‘priority area’ of DE for England and Wales and without this 
asset in place, our intelligence picture would be significantly reduced and I would seek to replace this asset very 
quickly to regain our understanding of the intentions of the DE groups that are listed. 
The covert surveillance of environmental direct action is regarded here as instrumental in intelligence-
led policing of domestic extremism, especially with regards to environmental activism. This theme is 
echoed by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), which makes reference to the fight 
against ‘serious criminality and serious disruption’. In a 2012 review of the police infiltration of protest 
groups, HMIC states that climate activists posed a serious and violent threat to public safety. The 
NPOIU is described as providing  
[…] intelligence on violent individuals, whose criminal intentions or acts were subsequently disrupted, and who 
were in some cases brought to justice. These were not individuals engaging in peaceful protest, or even people who 
were found to be guilty of lesser public order offences. They were individuals intent on perpetrating acts of a 
serious and violent nature against citizens going about their everyday lives (HMIC, 2012: 8). 
In the same report, environmental activism is offered as a specific example or violent and serious 
criminality:  
Environmental activists have been convicted of a range of offences over the last 10 years, associated with protests 
against (for instance) genetically modified crops; the burning of coal; and the expansion of aviation. Notable 
incidents have included the hijacking of a coal train in 2009 [sic], and conspiracies to disrupt power supplies 
(HMIC, 2012: 15). 
The perceived ‘threat’ posed by environmental protest was also a stated purpose in the authorisation of 
Kennedy’s involvement in the Drax coal train protest, which explicitly referred to the risk climate 
activists could pose to the public and permitted Kennedy to get involved in ‘actions connected to 
Climate Camp where the threat to the public is greater’.  
Intelligence-led public order policing? 
The police, police inspectorate and others have justified the deployment of undercover officers in 
environmental groups by exaggerating the threat posed by EDA towards public safety and national 
security. Yet, violence rarely forms part of the police’s delineation of domestic extremism, as in that 
given by the (now defunct) Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). 
Domestic extremism and extremists are the terms used for activity, individuals or campaign groups that carry out 
criminal acts of direct action in furtherance of what is typically a single issue campaign. They usually seek to 
prevent something from happening or to change legislation or domestic policy, but attempt to do so outside of the 
normal democratic process (ACPO, cited in HMIC, 2012). 
In descriptions such as these, environmental protesters are variously labelled ‘domestic extremists’ or 
‘serious criminals’, although clear definitions are frequently missing. But recent studies of anti-fracking 
protest in England have further documented that non-permissive and repressive policing tactics are 
based on police terminology that continues to demarcate rather arbitrarily between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
protesters, whereby ‘the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable protest in the police 
definition are not based on the use of violence but on the target and the desire to be disruptive’ 
(Jackson, et al., 2018). This dissonance between ‘extremism’ and ‘legitimate protest’ could be analysed 
as a ‘framing war’ (Hilson, 2012: 48): Climate change protesters are depicted by police and prosecutors 
as domestic extremists or otherwise opposed to basic democratic freedoms; meanwhile, they and their 
supporters highlight their image as non-violent defenders of environmental protection and international 
climate agreements.  
In the Drax 29 case, the dissonance between ‘extremism’ and disruption was also apparent in 
the lenient sentencing and the judge’s praise for the activists’ health and safety considerations, quite in 
contrast to the police’s framing of the group as a potential threat to public safety. It is further illustrated 
by the wider climate action movement in the UK, which is characterised by consistently non-violent 
protest even when faced with aggressive public order tactics (Greer and McLaughlin, 2010; Rosie and 
Gorringe, 2009; Baker, 2011; Gorringe and Rosie, 2013). 
The organisational background to the Drax coal train occupation was the British Camp for 
Climate Action – or Climate Camp – which existed as a network of environmental activists who put 
much of their organisational efforts into staging annual protest camps leading to mass direct actions. In 
2006, Climate Camp had chosen the Drax power station as a site for protest when it held a week-long 
action camp in a field a short distance from its imposing cooling towers, with some 700 activists in 
attendance, including Kennedy, who had taken a leading role in the logistical work to establish it as a 
base for an attempted (but failed) mass trespass of the power station site. In a police report, it is 
claimed that this was ‘the first time domestic extremism took place against national infrastructure in the 
country’ (cited in Evans et al., 2009). Two years later, Climate Camp returned with an even larger 
camp not far from a coal-fired power station. This time, they pitched up on the Hoo peninsula in the 
south of England with Kingsnorth power station as its visible backdrop. Again, a widely-publicised 
mass trespass was prevented by a large policing operation with protesters staging a demonstration at 
the power station’s front gate instead. 
The policing of the Climate Camps makes for an interesting setting to the infiltration of the 
activist group that planned the Drax coal train occupation. The policing at Kingsnorth in particular has 
been described as ‘intimidation’ with ‘1400 police officers from over 26 forces, making the police-
participant ratio almost 1:1’ (Saunders and Price, 2009: 118). Visitors to the camp were immediately 
struck by the overt police presence around the camp’s perimeter. A first ‘check-point’ was set up a 
couple of miles before one could get to the camp, with police pulling over cars and mini-buses taking 
protesters to the site and registering number plates and the personal details of the drivers. The campers 
were not permitted to drive down the public access road to the camp. Campaign equipment and food 
for the week-long protest camp had to be carried on foot for the last bit of the way. On arrival, police 
had set up a large stop-and-search area outside the entrance of the camp. Those entering and leaving 
would routinely be subjected to searches under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act or 
Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which meant that many participants were 
searched several times each day. Up the track past the stop-and-search area, new arrivals were greeted 
by a group of police with camera equipment taking film footage and photographs of everybody 
attending. The overt surveillance of the camp’s entrance point became one of the sore points of the 
police operation, with some also noting ‘persistent noisy surveillance from the air’ (Saunders and Price, 
2009: 118), the confiscation of essential camping items, and early morning raids of the site by large 
numbers of police in anti-riot equipment making sporadic use of batons and pepper spray.  
Other than the police’s own reviews into the policing of the Kingsnorth Climate Camp, there is 
little academic research. In one publication, Chief Inspector Adrian Moody, the principal team planner 
for the policing operation – Operation Oasis – argues that the police’s planning ‘occurred within a 
vacuum, devoid of adequate intelligence, information and dialogue’ (cited in Baker, 2011: 147). The 
Chief Inspector’s assertion appears implausible. Kennedy and possibly other undercover officers 
(UCOs) had taken active roles in the organisation of the successive Climate Camps as well as in the 
more secretive discussions in planning the trespass of the power station. The police certainly did not 
have to ‘rely on “open” sources’ (Baker, 2011: 147), as Moody insinuated. It is possible, though 
unlikely, that Moody in his role as the ‘principal Oasis team planner’ was left in the dark over the 
presence of UCOs within the organisation of the camp. But as Kennedy’s authorisation documents 
indicate, the communication between UCOs and their handlers was almost constant, so information 
about ‘who, where, when and what’ was available to key police personnel within his unit and to the 
authorising officers.  
As others have noted, ‘the ability of the authorities to defend a target named in advance, and to 
control or repress a camp site in open countryside is strong’ (North, 2011: 1593). But the ability to 
control and repress also rests heavily on the surveillance powers and capacities of which the police can 
make use. Whereas the disruptions to coal-fired power stations at the Climate Camps near Drax and 
near Kingsnorth had been called publicly and the organisation of the camps was semi-open, the more 
clandestine direct action of smaller groups of activists to disrupt the Drax power station by stopping a 
delivery of coal provided the police with a more formidable challenge. In such cases, intrusive 
surveillance has been a neglected ingredient in the police planning for public order management. In 
short, where the police agencies could not reasonably pre-empt its response to a protest event due to a 
lack of dialogue with organisers, they appear to have relied on covert intelligence sources to a greater 
extent than previously assumed. Further, the aim of protest infiltration, as in the preceding case study, 
was not the prevention of serious crime or of mitigating a threat to public safety. Rather what was at 
stake was the ability to regulate, facilitate and if needed incapacitate transgressive protest that evaded 
the traditional police-protester interactions and posed fundamental questions and challenges to key 
public policy fields. 
Conclusion 
The disclosure of the surveillance authorisation and operational logs in the Drax 29 case – analysed 
here as hidden and dirty data – has given us a rare chance to study police narratives of undercover 
work, including its justifications at management-level. It has shown that also when intrusive 
surveillance is targeted at protest groups it remains ‘embedded in the most mundane aspects of social 
life’ (Loftus and Goold, 2012: 285). The emotional and intimate relationships that UCO Kennedy had 
fostered with activists allowed him to remain deep undercover within EDA groups and to feed 
information about planned protest activities to his handlers. But as suggested, the covert policing of 
protest is not designed to detect and prevent crime; it is to fabricate and maintain order (Neocleous, 
2000). 
This study has also provided further evidence of the Janus-faced quality of contemporary 
protest policing (see Wilson and McCulloch, 2012). In the field of public order policing, on the one 
hand, efforts have been made at a high level to validate the notion of a British model of protest policing 
that relies on communication, negotiated management and protester-police liaison (for example HMIC, 
2009). Such an approach is often encouraged by a research community that seeks the democratic 
accountability of the police’s use of force and the guarantee of the human rights of protesters (for a 
critical engagement in the US context see McClanahan and Brisman, 2017). Invisible to the field of 
public order policing, on the other hand, lies a simultaneous development of covert policing tactics and 
technologies that drives advances in pre-emptive crime control, unaccountable and political policing, 
and post-democratic constructions of ‘political threats’ (McCulloch and Wilson, 2015). These are key 
elements of what Noakes and Gillham (2006) have called ‘strategic incapacitation’. The two trends are 
not necessarily contradictory. It remains true that ‘a police policy of toleration in the face of public 
demonstrations can certainly coexist with a policy of covert dirty tricks’ (Marx, 1998: 264).  
. 
Certainly, the surveillance of environmental protest and the discursive construction of 
transgressive protest as ‘extremism’ is not new. However, the recent exposures of police officers who 
operated undercover in social movements and protest groups in Britain add to our understanding of 
how surveillance works at a mundane level, and how it is justified by police decision-makers. The 
targeted activists are in no way ‘surprised’ that the police took an interest in their activities. But they 
remain shocked by the detail and the extent of infiltration.  
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